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EXTRADITION, THE CHARTER, 
AND DUE PROCESS: IS 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
ENOUGH? 
Dianne L. Martin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The promises inherent in the guarantee of the rule of law serve an ideologi-
cal function in a liberal democracy.1 However, the rule of law, and in particular 
the safeguards of due process, can and should serve more than a legitimating 
function. That is particularly true in regard to the criminal law, where the rule 
of law represents a promise that both the definition of criminal conduct and the 
selection of criminal subjects will be done fairly, never arbitrarily, and in a 
transparent manner. In turn the principles of fairness, transparency and legality, 
if honoured in form as well as substance, in spirit as well as letter, should de-
liver real, not merely rhetorical, security and safety. However, these are fragile 
principles, subject to competing arguments and to incremental erosion. That is 
particularly true when due process is portrayed as a hurdle for law enforcement 
to jump, as an obstacle to a swift and effective response to violence and terror, 
as is the case today, and has been the case on many occasions in the past.2 
Although the conditions facing government and challenging the principles of 
due process have been portrayed as unique in the weeks and months following 
the crimes of September 11, the rule of law has faced significant challenges 
before. The more some things change, the more they remain the same.  
                                                                                                                                                              
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. She is the current Director of the Inno-
cence Project, a clinical programme concerned with wrongful convictions, Director of the Part-time 
LLM in Criminal Law and the Institute for Feminist Legal Studies. 
1
 See, for example, Hutchison, The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology? (1987); Kennedy, A 
Critique of Adjudication (1997). 
2
  This was the insight that inspired Herbert Packer’s groundbreaking analysis of the crimi-
nal justice system and the argument that the system moves between due process concerns and law 
enforcement demands in a cyclical manner: Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968). 
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Thirty years ago terrorism was a domestic, not a foreign, threat. In the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s, equality seekers such as African Ameri-
cans and Native Americans, along with their student supporters,3 were treated 
by the FBI as a threat as great as communists had been perceived to be by 
Senator McCarthy and his supporters in the 1950s. The same was true in Can-
ada, although the rhetoric was less heated, as the RCMP and local police de-
voted considerable resources to surveying, infiltrating and disrupting domestic 
political opponents.4 These threats were attacked as aggressively as foreign 
threats are in 2002 — civil libertarian traditions, the rule of law and guarantees 
of due process notwithstanding. 
Remembering this recent past is important in assessing the significance of 
Canada’s 20 years of experience with an entrenched charter of rights and in 
evaluating current threats to due process. We now know, for example, that 
some, at least, of that earlier law enforcement effort was fatally flawed and not 
simply because it was illegal. The extreme methods used by law enforcement in 
the name of liberty produced bad data — they got the wrong people — and 
missed the right ones. Despite the Constitution, arguably well-meaning activists 
such as environmentalists were targeted in the United States and may actually 
have been deliberately framed as terrorist bombers,5 civil rights and protest 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
  COINTELPRO is an acronym for the FBI’s domestic “counterintelligence programs” de-
veloped to neutralize political dissent and dissidents. Although covert operations have been em-
ployed throughout FBI history, the formal COINTELPROs conducted between 1956-1971 were 
broadly targeted against radical political organizations. The existence of these operations was 
revealed publicly following an unsolved break-in into the FBI’s Media PA resident agency. Their 
extent was revealed in separate lawsuits by NBC Correspondent Carl Stern and the Socialist 
Workers’ Party, and a U.S. Senate investigation led by Senator Frank Church. The “Church Com-
mittee” reports, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976: 
Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, and Supplementary Detailed Staff 
Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, are a remarkable record 
of illegal activities, including a detailed study of “Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Case Study”; “The 
FBI’s Covert Action Program to Destroy the Black Panther Party”; and, for the purposes of this 
paper, “The Use of Informants in FBI Intelligence Investigations.” The Church Committee Reports, 
and other relevant original sources are available at http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/ 
cointelpro/cointel.htm (date accessed: April 5, 2002). 
4
  The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, prepared by Philip Rosen, Senior Analyst 
(rev’d January 24, 2000), online: Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/ 
library/PRBpubs/8427-e.htm> (date accessed: April 5, 2002). 
5
  A law suit making precisely this claim, brought by environmentalist Judi Bari, went to 
trial in April 2002 and ended successfully for the plaintiffs on June 11, 2002. Earth First! activist 
Darryl Cherney and the estate of Judi Bari, who died of cancer in 1997, successfully sued seven 
former and current FBI agents and Oakland policemen for false arrest, illegal search, slanderous 
statements and conspiracy for police conduct following a May 1990 bomb explosion. They claimed 
officials ignored evidence exonerating the activists and lied to try to make their case. Jurors 
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groups were infiltrated and destabilized, and members were prosecuted on false 
evidence.6 The lessons of that history, and those derived more recently from the 
“laboratory of wrongful convictions”7 support the argument that due process is 
and should be more than a guarantor of fairness in the game sense of ensuring 
that the formal rules are followed.8 Substantive due process also ensures accu-
racy of outcome and contributes to security and safety in ways that neither its 
breach nor its merely formal recognition can. That is the argument made in this 
brief  
consideration of the Charter,9 extradition law and current threats to due process. 
That is, that achieving rectitude of decision making through fair, efficient and 
transparent investigations and prosecutions reduces error and thereby increases 
security, despite attempts to argue the contrary. The lessons learned from the 
“laboratory of wrongful convictions” are utilized in an examination of the 1976 
extradition from Canada of American Indian Movement leader Leonard Peltier 
and then applied to the record of the Supreme Court’s cautious extension of 
Charter rights to extradition and expulsion cases. 
                                                                                                                                                              
awarded 4.4 million dollars in damages after 17 days of deliberations: Associated Press, “Jury 
awards California activists $4.4 million,” (June 11, 2002), online: The New York Times on the Web 
<www.nytimes.com> and Judi Bari home page <www.judibari.org> (date accessed June 11, 2002). 
Most of the pleadings and evidence relied on in the various motions and a range of journalistic 
accounts are found at the Bari home page: <http://www.judibari.org> (date accessed: April 6, 
2002). That page reproduces the judgment finally dismissing a motion to strike the statement of 
claim: “To summarize them, plaintiffs charge that their (false) arrest and the attendant searches 
(including the second search of Judi’s house a month after the bombing) were deliberately carried 
out without probable cause, through the instigation of the FBI and with the knowing and willing 
cooperation of the Oakland Police Department, for the purpose of politically discrediting and 
“neutralizing” plaintiffs’ organizing work on behalf of Redwood Summer, Earth First!, and the 
environment generally” [www.judibari.org/%60legal_ 
index.html]. 
6
 Churchill and Vander Wall, Agents of Repression: The FBI’s Secret Wars Against the 
Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement (1988); Amnesty International, Proposal 
for a Commission of Inquiry into the Effect of Domestic Intelligence Activities on Criminal Trials in 
the United States of America (1981). In Canada see McDonald, Commission of Inquiry Concerning 
Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (1981). 
7
  The expression refers to the more than 200 cases of wrongful conviction discovered in the 
past 10 or so years across the common-law world: Martin, “Lessons About Justice from the “Labo-
ratory” of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence” 
(2002) UMKC L. Rev. (forthcoming). 
8
  Rules that can be dismissed as a “luxury” at times of danger. 
9
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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II.  WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, EXTRADITION AND  
THE RULE OF LAW 
The Rule of Law promises that the exercise of state power will not be arbi-
trary. That means that the rules — the substantive law — will be certain, 
known and knowable and prospective so that all can know how to conduct 
themselves and their affairs. It also means that the rules (and the benefits) will 
apply equally to all, and be enforced equally and transparently, without bias or 
favour. Criminal investigations will be conducted fairly without corruption, 
illegality or abuse of authority. Criminal trials will be held publicly, before an 
independent tribunal. The rights of the accused will be respected: she or he will 
know the case he or she has to meet, will have the effective assistance of coun-
sel and the right to make full answer and defence. The principles are well 
known. 
It is also well known that in the cases of wrongful conviction, these princi-
ples were not honoured, but rather were, in most cases, deliberately and me-
thodically trampled.10 If this is so, it becomes important to ask in what other 
circumstances — less visible than the high profile cases and trials in the known 
roster of wrongful conviction, and even secret in the case of political investiga-
tions and prosecutions — that these principles were not honoured, even in the 
breach. Moreover, given the opportunity for reflection that the wrongful con-
viction cases provide, we must ask whether we are protecting the right values 
by protecting the form but ignoring the substance. In that context it is well to 
remember that due process claims that hold the state and state agents to account 
are not popular. Lord Denning’s chilling comment in the IRA pub bombing 
case known as the “Birmingham Six” (subsequently revealed to be one in a 
series of British wrongful convictions) that to permit a lawsuit to continue 
against police for their treatment of the accused in obtaining confessions would 
suggest that it was possible that the police had lied to put innocent men behind 
bars, is a classic case in point. In striking the statement of claim, he described 
this possibility as “an appalling vista” that he would not countenance.11  
                                                                                                                                                              
10
  The growing literature analyzing wrongful convictions makes this clear. For example, see 
Martin, “The Police Role in Wrongful Convictions: An International Comparative Study” in 
Westervelt and Humphrey (eds.), Wrongly Convicted: When Justice Fails (2001). 
11
  McIlkenney v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force, [1980] Q.B. 283 (C.A.), 
affd, Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force, [1982] A.C. 529 (H.L.). Of course, 
as subsequent investigation finally established, after innocent men had spent many years behind 
bars, that is exactly what they had done. They were finally released in March 1991. The details of 
the misconduct are set out in Mullin, Error of Judgement: The Truth About the Birmingham Bomb-
ings (rev’d ed. 1990).) 
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Unthinking faith in the propriety of investigative and prosecution conduct 
contributes to the idea that rules that advance the search for truth are those that 
assist the prosecution to present a wider array of inculpatory evidence.12 Rules 
that are relied on by the defence are often categorized as advancing “fairness,” 
without recognition that proper investigation practices, whether justified as 
ensuring fairness or not, will also, in most cases, contribute to reliability. This 
odd bias is apparent even in the context of a wrongful conviction, where almost 
none of the prosecution evidence is true, and the wrong person was selected as 
a suspect, investigated, prosecuted and convicted. For example, in dealing with 
jailhouse informants, “the most deceitful and deceptive group of witnesses 
known to frequent the courts,” Justice Cory, in his recommendations arising out 
of the wrongful conviction of Thomas Sophonow, was concerned only that 
“their presence as witnesses signals the end of any hope of providing a fair 
trial”13 (emphasis added). 
The Thomas Sophonow case illustrates the limits of formal due process well. 
Sophonow was tried three times for the December 1981 murder by strangling 
of Barbara Stoppel in Winnipeg, Manitoba, before finally being not just acquit-
ted but exonerated in 2000. He should never have been convicted at all. There 
was no known connection between Stoppel and Sophonow, and the prosecu-
tion’s case which rested on highly dubious eyewitness testimony, was aug-
mented by jailhouse informers. No fewer than 11 had come forward before the 
third trial. Justice Cory was moved to make remarkably detailed findings and 
recommendations to limit the use of such testimony in the future. He framed his 
findings in the context of providing the accused with a fair trial: 
Their testimony has all too often resulted in a wrongful conviction. When such a 
miscarriage of justice occurs, the entire system of justice suffers. Indeed, the entire 
community suffers as a result of the demonstrated inability to provide the accused 
with a fair trial. How many wrongful convictions must there be before the use of 
these informants is forbidden or, at least, confined to very rare cases. In the rare 
case that they are called, their testimony should automatically be subject to the 
strongest possible warning to jurors to approach it with great caution. Lawyers, par-
ticularly Crown Counsel and Judges, must be made aware of the irreparable dam-
age that these informants can cause to the administration of justice in Canada.14 
[Emphasis added.] 
                                                                                                                                                              
12
  Martin, “Developments in The Law of Evidence: The 1996-97 Term: The Adversary Pro-
cess and The Search for Truth” (1998), 9 S.C.L.R. 345; Martin, “Retribution Revisited: A Recon-
sideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform Strategies” (1998), 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 151. 
13
  Jailhouse Informants, Their Unreliability, and the Importance of Complete Crown Disclosure 
Pertaining to Them [The Sophonow Inquiry, online: <http://www.gov.mb.ca/ 
justice/sophonow/jailhouse/index.html> (date accessed: April 2, 2002). 
14
  Ibid. 
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This definition of due process as a concern primarily of fairness to an ac-
cused obscures issues of evidence reliability and investigative misconduct. In 
turn, it legitimates the decision that close scrutiny of the evidence and evi-
dence-gathering procedures will never be permitted in extradition and other 
cases which rest on an assumption of investigative reliability and probity — 
even when a reasonable question of misconduct is raised. For this reason, ex-
tradition is a useful procedure against which to test the proposition that due 
process should include the potential for deeper scrutiny of investigative con-
duct. It is a procedure on the margins of the criminal justice system, enjoys few 
formally protected due process safeguards, and often concerns cases that chal-
lenge any claim to fairness at all. The requesting state needs only to produce, in 
documentary form, a prima facie case. The process relies upon the “good faith 
of nations” to ensure that the fugitive is not in effect being hijacked with false 
evidence to face an unfair trial. The fugitive, whose probable guilt is assumed 
for the purposes of the process, has no right of confrontation, no right to chal-
lenge the facts or the witnesses brought against him. These limits render illu-
sory the affirmation by the Supreme Court that extradition proceedings must 
comply with due process safeguards and will attract constitutional protection, in 
particular that of section 7.15  
Indeed the Court has been very clear that the scope of that protection is nar-
row.16 In the majority of cases where the Charter was relied on, they have ruled 
consistently that absent “extreme circumstances,” they will not consider argu-
ments suggesting that the extradition process violates Canadian constitutional 
rights, as there is a presumption that the receiving country will afford the fugi-
tive a fair trial. There are clearly good and pragmatic reasons for this caution, 
                                                                                                                                                              
15
  For example, the Court found constitutional error in United States v. Kwok, [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 532; United States v. Tsioubris, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 613; United States v. Cobb, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
587; United States v. Shulman, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 616; and United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
283. 
16
  Even those rules which raise issues of reliability as well as fairness are beyond review in 
extradition cases. In R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, an inculpatory statement obtained when 
Harrer was interrogated in the United States concerning immigration status was held by the Su-
preme Court to be admissible despite a Charter breach. The breach, failure to give a 
right-to-counsel warning when questioning changed focus from the immigration matter to possible 
involvement with an offence in Canada, was not recognized in U.S. law. The Court analyzed the 
rule concerning a secondary caution only in the context of the importance of ensuring the fairness 
of the Canadian justice system and general respect for Canadian constitutional values. Because this 
issue did not arise with respect to police forces abroad, the Court concluded that the only relevant 
concern was the “fairness” of the trial, with no consideration of the reliability of the statement. That 
justification for the confessions rule was never alluded to. 
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of course. As Justice La Forest noted in the frequently cited case Canada v. 
Schmidt:17 
The present system of extradition works because courts give the treaties a fair and 
liberal interpretation with a view to fulfilling Canada’s obligations, reducing the 
technicalities of criminal law to a minimum and trusting the courts in the foreign 
country to give the fugitive a fair trial, including such matters as giving proper 
weight to the evidence and adequate consideration of available defences and the 
dictates of due process generally.18 [Emphasis added.] 
The rationale for the rule is clear: 
Extradition is the surrender by one state to another, on request, of persons accused 
or convicted of committing a crime in the state seeking the surrender. This is ordi-
narily done pursuant to a treaty or other arrangement between these states acting in 
their sovereign capacity and obviously engages their honour and good faith.19  
The factual foundation of the request for extradition is based on at least some 
evidence that the fugitive committed the crime in question: 
That is why provision is made in the treaties and in the Extradition Act to ensure 
that, before the discretion to surrender can be exercised, a judicial hearing must be 
held for the purpose of determining whether there is such evidence of the crime al-
leged to have been committed in the foreign country as would, according to the law 
of Canada, justify his or her committal for trial if it had been committed here.20 [Em-
phasis added.] 
This safeguard rests on the belief that the requesting state will act in good 
faith and only present genuine evidence to the judicial hearing — otherwise, the 
hearing provides no safeguard at all. In other words, the most salient safeguard 
for the fugitive is the assumption that Canada only enters into extradition trea-
ties with those countries it “knows” will afford a fugitive a fair trial. The reality 
that a “fair trial” premised on the presence of formal safeguards alone may still 
produce a miscarriage of justice is only now being acknowledged, albeit some-
what reluctantly. The difficulty, of course, is that because of the scores of 
wrongful convictions that have come to light, we now know that apparently 
guilty people, who give apparently truthful confessions, are not guilty at all. 
Rules which merely require an assertion of compliance have turned out to be 
inadequate guarantors of either fairness or a reliable result. 
                                                                                                                                                              
17
  [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500. 
18
  Ibid., at 524. 
19
  Ibid., at 514. 
20
  Ibid., at 515. 
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III.  THE LABORATORY OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
Wrongful convictions are more than a failure of justice. These cases pro-
vide an opportunity to examine critically both the practices of criminal in-
vestigation and the scope of review. Advances in investigative techniques 
and forensic science such as DNA identification have contributed to the 
identification and remedy of wrongful convictions all over the common-law 
world.21 These cases provide a virtual laboratory for examining the criminal 
justice process. Errors in death penalty cases in the United States have gen-
erated enormous scholarly attention.22 The IRA pub bombing wrongful con-
victions in Britain generated first a Royal Commission and then an 
independent agency for the review of cases.23 In Canada24 and Australia,25 
                                                                                                                                                              
21
  The National Institute of Justice analysis of 28 DNA exonerations was enormously valu-
able in this regard: Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the 
Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence after Trial (1996). For a follow up analysis, including 
the scores of exonerations since 1996, see: Scheck and Neufeld, “DNA and Innocence Scholarship” 
in Westervelt and Humphrey (eds.), Wrongly Convicted: When Justice Fails, (2001), at 241-52. 
22
  Bedau and Radelet, “Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases” (1987), 40 Stan. 
L. Rev. 21-179; Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin, Convicted But Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and 
Public Policy (1996); Radelet, Bedau and Putnam, In Spite of Innocence (1992); Radelet, Lofquist 
and Bedau, “Prisoners Released from Death Rows since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their 
Guilt” (1997), 13 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 907-966; Rosenbaum, “Inevitable Error: Wrongful New 
York State Homicide Convictions, 1965-1988” (1990-91), XVIII:3 Review of Law & Social 
Change 807-830. Most recently, Professor James S. Liebman and Professor Simon H. Rifkind, of 
Columbia University School of Law, published their review of all death penalty cases in the United 
States since 1972: A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995. The study, initially 
commissioned by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1991, found an overall rate of prejudicial error 
in the American capital punishment system of 68 percent. Of this number, on retrial 82 percent of the 
people whose capital judgments were overturned by state post-conviction courts due to serious error 
were found to deserve a sentence less than death when the errors were cured on retrial; 7 percent were 
found to be innocent of the capital crime. The nature of the errors are significant for consideration of 
the meaning of due process. The most common errors (the majority) were “(1) egregiously incompe-
tent defense lawyers who didn’t even look for — and demonstrably missed — important evidence that 
the defendant was innocent or did not deserve to die; and (2) police or prosecutors who did discover 
that kind of evidence but suppressed it, again keeping it from the jury”: online: The Justice Project 
<http://justice.policy.net/ 
jpreport> Executive Summary (date accessed: June 1, 2002). An equally troubling record was found in 
a study of death penalty cases in Illinois. That report has just been published: Report of the Governor’s 
Commission on Capital Punishment (April 2002), online: Governor’s Commission on Capital Punish-
ment <http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/ 
reports/commission_reports.html> (date accessed June 1, 2002).  
23
  Journalistic accounts of the IRA cases were instrumental in exposing the wrongful convic-
tions. See Conlon, Proved Innocent (1991); McKee and Franey, Time Bomb: Irish Bombers, English 
Justice, and the Guilford Four (1988); Mullin, Error of Judgment: The Truth About the Birmingham 
Bombings (1990). The scandal led to The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1991) and the 
formation of the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC). The Web site provides a wealth of 
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both popular accounts and Commissions of Inquiry have been influential in 
generating a new awareness of the fallibility of the prosecution process, and 
informed scholarly critiques of current investigative and prosecution practices. 
Some well-founded propositions have emerged from this literature. The sys-
temic nature of wrongful convictions is being recognized, and the more com-
forting notion these are merely the inevitable errors of a human system26 has 
been refuted for the most part. Instead it has become clear that most wrongful 
convictions could have been prevented by challenging the bias dubbed “tunnel 
vision” (a compendium of common heuristics and logical fallacies), which is 
fueled by pressure to resolve a high-profile crime or is internally generated by 
resource and other institutional forces. Investigators blinded by tunnel vision 
focus on a suspect and then select and filter the evidence that will “build a 
case” for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away 
from guilt. All stages of the process, from witness interviews, eyewitness pro-
cedures, interrogation of suspects and the management of informers, may be 
contaminated in ways that have been identified in virtually all known cases of 
wrongful conviction.27 The pressure to resolve the case contributes to what has 
                                                                                                                                                              
data: <http://www.ccrc.gov.uk>. Recent statistics may be found at 
http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/latestnews/latestnews_case.html (date accessed: April 2, 2002). Also see Zuck-
erman, “Miscarriage of Justice — A Root Treatment”, [1992] 323-45. 
24
  In Canada see, for example, Karp and Rosner, When Justice Fails: The David Milgaard 
Story (1991); Makin, Redrum the Innocent: The Guy Paul Morin Story (1998). Inquiries have been 
held concerning three of the more notorious wrongful convictions; another is expected soon con-
cerning the David Milgaard case. See Hickman, Poitras and Evans, Royal Commission on the Donald 
Marshall, Jr. Prosecution (1989); Kaufman, Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin 
(1998), online: Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/ 
html/MORIN/morin.htm> (date accessed: April 2, 2002); and Cory, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas 
Sophonow, (2002), online: <http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/sophonow/ 
index.html> (date accessed: April 2, 2002). And see Martin, “Unredressed Wrong: The Extradition 
of Leonard Peltier from Canada” in Boyd and Menzies (eds.), (Ab)Using Power: The Canadian 
Experience (2001), at 214-35. 
25
  In Australia, see The Royal Commission of Inquiry into Chamberlain Convictions (1987); 
Wood, The Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service. (1997). 
26
  Markman and Cassell, “Protecting the Innocent: a Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study” 
(1988), 41 Stan. L. Rev. 121; Cassell, “Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost 
Confessions — And from Miranda” (1998), 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 497. 
27
  It was addressed most recently by retired justice the Honourable Peter Cory in the 
Sophonow Inquiry. He said: 
Tunnel Vision is insidious. It can affect an officer or, indeed, anyone involved in the 
administration of justice with sometimes tragic results. It results in the officer becoming so 
focussed upon an individual or incident that no other person or incident registers in the offi-
cer’s thoughts. Thus, tunnel vision can result in the elimination of other suspects who 
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been called “noble cause corruption” (a version of the “ends justify the means” 
philosophy), first identified in England by Sir John Woodcock, the Chief In-
spector of Constabulary, in 1992.28 The conduct that is explained in this way 
may include everything from disregard for due process safeguards, to overt 
pressure on witnesses to give evidence that will support a conviction of the 
selected suspect, to falsification of evidence, all in the name of securing a 
conviction of someone police have decided is guilty.29  
We know as well that when the community is particularly frightened or an-
gered by the crime and the accused is a marginalized or racialized outsider, the 
risk increases.30 These errors are difficult to discern or to refute, but their per-
sistence renders the preservation of due process safeguards more than a luxury. 
It is particularly important when there are few, if any, means to test the evi-
dence or the investigation, such as occurs in extradition and cases driven by the 
new national security regime, where much of the evidence is produced in affi-
davit form and rests on informer information filtered through the lens of law 
enforcement. 
IV.  THE EXTRADITION OF LEONARD PELTIER 
The story of the extradition of Leonard Peltier from Canada more than 25 
years ago provides an ideal case study for considering issues of extradition, 
wrongful conviction and due process. Leonard Peltier is serving two consecu-
tive life sentences for the murder of two FBI Special Agents killed during a 
four-hour-long fire fight on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota 
on June 26, 1975. His extradition from Canada in 1976, trial in North Dakota 
and continued imprisonment without parole are widely seen as unjust, but 
                                                                                                                                                              
should be investigated. Equally, events which could lead to other suspects are eliminated from 
the officer’s thinking. Anyone, police officer, counsel or judge can become infected by this 
virus.  
Cory, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow, (2002). See recommendations: 
<http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/sophonow/index.html> (date accessed: April 2, 2002).  
28
  He used the phrase in a speech to the International Policing Exhibition and Conference, 
October 13, 1992, and it was picked up and discussed by Metropolitan Commissioner Paul Condon 
addressing the Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs: The Independent (March 25, 1993). 
29
  The nomenclature was critiqued by Wood J. in his examination of corruption in the New 
South Wales police in Australia. He preferred the term “process corruption” and defined it in 
helpful terms: “It is often directed at those members of the community who are least likely or least 
able to complain, and is justified by police on the basis of procuring the conviction of persons 
suspected of criminal or anti-social conduct, or in order to exercise control over sections of the 
community.” Wood, Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service: Final Report, 
Volume I: Corruption, (1997). 
30
  Scheck and Neufeld, supra, note 21, at 241-52; Martin, supra, note 10. 
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efforts to reopen the extradition to obtain either a new trial or presidential 
clemency have so far failed.31 Most recently, the Innocence Project of Osgoode 
Hall Law School took up the case.32 They were responding to the assertion of 
Canadian Minister of Justice Anne McLellan that there was no new evidence to 
warrant reconsideration of the extradition, made to U.S. Attorney General Janet 
Reno in a letter dated October 12, 1999. The history of that assertion is that, 
while Canadian Department of Justice officials have long officially denied that 
an extradition fraud occurred, others, equally well informed, have repeatedly 
expressed concern about it.33 The Innocence Project34 undertook to search for 
the evidence that would resolve this dispute.  
                                                                                                                                                              
31
  The Canadian part of the story is told briefly in Martin, “Unredressed Wrong,” supra, note 
24, while the entire story is set out in Matthiessen, The Spirit of Crazy Horse (2d ed. 1991); and see 
<http://freepeltier.org/press_release/040402.htm> (date accessed: July 2, 2002) for details of a 
lawsuit just launched because of a campaign conducted by the FBI to stop former president Bill 
Clinton from issuing Peltier a grant of executive clemency during his last days in office. FBI agents 
across the nation submitted letters to the editor, sponsored major newspaper and radio ads, and 
marched by the hundreds in front of the White House to discourage clemency. Former FBI Director 
Louis Freeh wrote searing letters to Bill Clinton and Janet Reno to urge against Peltier’s release. 
The campaign, which gained national attention, characterized Peltier as a cold-blooded killer who 
brutally shot two FBI agents at point blank range. Peltier’s attorneys and supporters assert that this 
characterization is not only false but intentionally deceptive given the government’s long-held 
position that it cannot prove who shot the agents. Furthermore, they say it cost Peltier, now 57 years 
of age and in poor health, his deserved freedom. 
32
  The Innocence Project is a clinical programme at Osgoode Hall Law School, York Univer-
sity, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, which involves law students under the supervision of the current 
Director Dianne L. Martin in investigating and seeking to remedy miscarriages of justice 
(<http://www.yorku.ca/dmartin/Innocence/innocenc.htm>). The work of the Innocence Project on 
behalf of Leonard Peltier actually began five years ago when the Aboriginal Law Students Society 
at Osgoode Hall Law School took up his cause and culminated in a lengthy brief to then President 
William Clinton based on the evidence gathered by the Innocence Project, including evidence given 
before the Honourable Fred Kaufman December 2000: The Innocence Project, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, Director: Dianne L. Martin, The Wrongful Extradition of Leonard Peltier 
from Canada: Brief in Support of the Grant of Executive Clemency, (December 5, 2000), online: 
<http://osgoode.yorku.ca/QuickPlace/innocenceproject/ 
Main.nsf/> (date accessed: April 8, 2002). 
33
  Former Solicitor General of Canada, and former Minister of Indian Affairs, the Honour-
able Warren Allmand reported to then Justice Minister Allan Rock on August 8, 1995, that his 
review of the extradition files convinced him that there was fraud and misconduct at the extradition 
and that he should either say so, in support of an application for clemency, or order an independent 
external review of the matter. Justice Minister Rock did not act. However, on October 12, 1999, his 
successor, Anne McLellan, chose to rely instead on the position the extradition group of the De-
partment of Justice has always taken in this case, did not refer it for an independent review, and 
wrote to U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno that “no evidence has come to light since [1976] that 
would justify the conclusion that the decisions of the Canadian courts and the Minister should be 
interfered with.” 
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New evidence was in fact available concerning FBI conduct consistent with 
what is now known to be a factor in many wrongful convictions and consistent 
with “COINTELPRO” (Counter Intelligence Program) misconduct. Both the 
operation of “tunnel vision” as the case was built and the rationalization of 
“noble cause corruption” in the use of unreliable evidence from informers and 
jailhouse informers emerged as significant factors in the extradition case. 
1. Tunnel Vision 
The shooting deaths of two federal agents (and one aboriginal man) during a 
still unexplained firefight on Pine Ridge Indian Reservation set off one of the 
largest manhunts in American history. All members of the American Indian 
Movement who were on Pine Ridge on June 26, 1975, were suspects, with little 
to distinguish one from another, as all were armed and all participated in the 
firefight between law enforcement and the residents of Pine Ridge. Leonard 
Peltier was initially selected as a suspect because there was an outstanding 
charge against him in Wisconsin of attempted murder of a police officer (which 
they described as a conviction).35 The motive for his choice out of many bears 
no relation to hard evidence, as an early FBI telex reveals: 
Inasmuch as solid evidence has been uncovered placing Leonard Peltier at the 
scene of the crime firing at Law Enforcement, consideration is being given to ob-
taining a warrant for aiding and abetting murder, Cir. Ausa has verbally given his 
authorization. Even though Peltier might be deceased, much benefit could be ob-
tained from national press showing type of individual agents faced in battle. [Em-
phasis added.]36 
The FBI strategy in regard to Leonard Peltier, and the others who were 
eventually charged, is a classic example of “tunnel vision.” While today, tunnel 
vision is understood as a major cause of wrongful convictions, in July 1975 it 
was common practice. In order to build a case against this useful suspect, the 
FBI decided to first: “[d]evelop information to lock Peltier and Black Horse 
into this case” and then “[d]evelop additional confidential informants and 
                                                                                                                                                              
34
  The Innocence Project was supported by the Association in Defense of the Wrongly Con-
victed (AIDWYC); a coalition of Canadian labour organizations and unions; and The Leonard 
Peltier Defence Committee Canada. 
35
  It is relevant to note in assessing the forensic, as contrasted with the public relations, value 
of this information, that Leonard Peltier was readily acquitted by a jury on the Wisconsin charge 
and in fact has no criminal record (apart from the murder convictions). 
36
 Teletype from SAC Richard G. Held, Pine Ridge to Director, dated July 6, 1975, six 
pages: Martin, “Unredressed Wrong,” supra, note 24. 
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sources” and only then engage in “[e]xamining the evidence and connecting it 
to the suspects.”37 
There was little direct evidence to “lock Peltier” into the case, but the FBI 
did “develop” a confidential informant. That informant provided the only direct 
evidence of Leonard Peltier’s guilt presented at the extradition hearing. It con-
sisted of two affidavits sworn by one Myrtle Poor Bear: one on February 23, 
1976, and another on March 31, 1976.38 These two affidavits were not entirely 
consistent. In the February 23, 1976 affidavit, Myrtle Poor Bear stated that she 
was Leonard Peltier’s girlfriend around the time the agents were shot and that 
she was aware that Leonard Peltier was in charge of planning how to kill any 
police officer or FBI agent who came onto the reservation and how to escape 
thereafter. She then swore that she saw him shoot both agents.39 In the March 
31, 1976, affidavit, the claim that she was Leonard Peltier’s girlfriend is re-
peated. This time, the affidavit describes Leonard Peltier shooting one of the 
wounded FBI agents as that agent threw down his handgun and told Mr. Peltier 
that he was surrendering. The affidavit continues that Mr. Peltier shot the agent 
even though Myrtle Poor Bear tried unsuccessfully to pull him away. The 
description is of a cold-blooded execution.40 
On May 3, 1976, the extradition hearing began in Vancouver, British Co-
lumbia. On June 18, 1976, the extradition judge, Schultz J. of the British Co-
lumbia Supreme Court, ordered Mr. Peltier committed for extradition on the 
murders of Agents Williams and Coler. Myrtle Poor Bear was the heart of the 
case. He did not know that a third affidavit existed, inconsistent in part with the 
two he read, where she swore she had not witnessed the murders, but that she 
had merely heard Peltier confess to them. That affidavit had been suppressed. 
Nor did he know that in any event none of the affidavits were true in any re-
spect. Not surprisingly, when he ordered the committal, he was brief in his 
discussion of the evidence on the FBI murders.  
However, evidence of the suppression of a contradictory affidavit, and evi-
dence confirming that all the Poor Bear affidavits were false, surfaced before 
Mr. Peltier was surrendered to the United States. Given the law of the day, that 
information did not change anything. On December 17, 1976, Justice Minister 
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  Teletype from Rapid City FBI to Director, “Daily Summary Teletype” dated July 16, 
1975, two pages: Martin, “Unredressed Wrong,” supra, note 24.  
38
  Affidavits of Myrtle Poor Bear sworn before clerk B. Berry, February 23, 1976. Affidavit 
of Myrtle Poor Bear sworn before clerk B. Berry, March 31, 1976. Exhibit No. 1 of the Canadian 
Hearing, October 25, 2000: Martin, “Unredressed Wrong,” supra, note 24.  
39
 Affidavit of Myrtle Poor Bear sworn before clerk B. Berry, February 23, 1976. Exhibit 
No. 1 of the Canadian Hearing, October 25, 2000: Martin, “Unredressed Wrong,” supra, note 24.  
40
 Affidavit of Myrtle Poor Bear sworn before clerk B. Berry, March 31, 1976. Exhibit No. 1 
of the Canadian Hearing, October 25, 2000: Martin, “Unredressed Wrong,” supra, note 24.  
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Ron Basford ordered Mr. Peltier’s extradition as it had “not been demon-
strated” to him that the offenses were of a political character, the only issue he 
considered. The surrender was ordered in spite of evidence and submissions 
concerning the conditions on Pine Ridge and FBI misconduct in the matter of 
the false Poor Bear affidavits.41  
2. Noble Cause Corruption 
There is no doubt that the affidavits were untrue (their falsity has long been 
acknowledged by Canadian and U.S. prosecutors alike). The issue rather has 
been whether the FBI agents who prepared the case, Agents Wood and Price, 
should have known (or did know) that Myrtle Poor Bear was not a witness to 
murder, nor the recipient of a confession.42 The evidence that points to the latter 
conclusion has two parts. 
First, the means by which Myrtle Poor Bear was “developed” as a witness is 
a classic example of the risks inherent in informant evidence generally.43 At the 
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 Press Release, Minister of Justice, December 17, 1976: Martin, “Unredressed Wrong,” su-
pra, note 24.  
42
  In 1978 at Peltier’s first appeal, U.S. prosecutor Evan Hultman acknowledged that Poor 
Bear had no truthful evidence to give. He said there “was not one scintilla of evidence that showed 
that Myrtle Poor Bear was there, knew anything, did anything” and agreed with the comment from 
the bench that the FBI had to know they were doing something wrong in their repetitive questioning 
of Poor Bear. Excerpts from oral argument from magnetic tape U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, April 12, 1978 (No. 77-1487) at 7326-7, Martin, “Unredressed Wrong,” supra, note 
24. A few days later they clarified the admission of misconduct while confirming that Poor Bear’s 
affidavit evidence was not true. In a letter of April 18, 1978, “The government has never conceded 
that Myrtle Poor Bear’s allegations at trial concerning alleged threats and coercion by the FBI are 
true. In fact, we categorically deny they are true. What we conceded at oral argument is what we 
contended at trial and in our appellee’s brief, namely, that Myrtle Poor Bear was indeed an incom-
petent and unbelievable witness. We also conceded that when viewed in context of the full investi-
gation, her statements to the FBI that she was an eyewitness on June 26, 1975, are probably not 
true,” cited L. Erin McKey, Counsel, International Assistance Group, Department of Justice, United 
States of America v. Leonard Peltier, File Review (May 1994), online: 
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/rev/extrad76.html> (date accessed: June 4, 2002). 
43
  The use, protection of and risks associated with police informants is well known to the 
law. In R v. Scott, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979, at 994, Cory J. stressed the importance of informers in 
general and in particular in the context of drug investigations: “The value of informers to police 
investigations has long been recognized. As long as crimes have been committed, certainly as long 
as they have been prosecuted, informers have played an important role in their investigation.” An 
informer survived a Charter challenge in R v. Hunter (1987), 57 C.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). It has also 
been the subject of considerable study by criminologists. Clifford Zimmerman sets out the long 
history and chequered history of informants use in Zimmerman, “From the Jailhouse to the Court-
house: The Role of Informants in Wrongful Convictions” in Westervelt and Humphrey (eds.), 
Wrongly Convicted: When Justice Fails (2001) at 57-59. And see Wool, “Police Informants in 
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hearing before Justice Kaufman, Ms. Poor Bear described in detail the steps 
taken by the agents to isolate her from family and friends and to intimidate her 
into co-operating with the “script” they had prepared for her.44 
Second, the FBI was not able to corroborate the statements taken from Ms. 
Poor Bear (which she insists were composed by the agents) in any particular. 
Efforts to find corroboration even for her presence on Pine Ridge failed. Analy-
sis of the approximately 100 unidentified fingerprints at the scene of the crime 
failed to link even one to Myrtle Poor Bear.45 Perhaps most significantly, in 
light of present knowledge, the agents took active steps to “develop” corrobora-
tion for Poor Bear in the form of two jailhouse informants. The first one, 
Marvin, claimed to know that Myrtle Poor Bear was Leonard Peltier’s girl-
friend, the first foundation fact in her affidavits (in reality they had never 
met).46 However, “Marvin” was too unreliable a witness, in the prosecutor’s 
opinion, and he never testified.47 
                                                                                                                                                              
Canada: The Law and Reality” (1985-86), 50 Sask. L. Rev. 249; Farris “The Confidential Infor-
mant: Management and Control, in Palmietto (ed.), Critical Issues in Criminal Investigations 
(1988). All of the many texts written for police officers on the subject all urge caution in regard to 
the high risk of obtaining false information: Mallory, Informants, Development and Management 
(2000). For a detailed description of that risk and the careless management of informant evidence 
that was the practice in the FBI for many years, see the May 2001 statement of John C. Ryan, a 
Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from February 28, 1966 to October 11, 
1987, in the Bari/Cherney civil rights suit against the FBI and Oakland Police, online: 
<http://www.judibari.org/Ryan 
050701.html> (date accessed: April 3, 2002). 
44
  Canadian Hearing, October 25, 2000, Evidence of Myrtle Poor Bear. Ms. Poor Bear had 
never been permitted to give this evidence. Attempts to have it heard at Leonard Peltier’s trial were 
unsuccessful when the trial judge ruled her evidence inadmissible. The prosecution decided not to 
call her, acknowledging that she “had no evidence to give” and calling her “incompetent,” a posi-
tion accepted by the trial judge. He said:  
If the witness as she testified yesterday were to be a believable witness, the Court 
would have seriously considered allowing her testimony to go to the jury on the grounds 
that if believed by the jury the facts she testified to were such that they would shock the 
conscience of the Court and in the interests of justice should be considered by the jury. 
However, for the reasons given on the record yesterday the Court concluded the danger of 
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury and unfair prejudice outweighed the possibility 
that the witness was believable. 
 United States of America v. Leonard Peltier (1977), at 4657, McKey, File Review, supra, 
note 42. 
45
  Canadian Hearing, October 25, 2000, at 165, line 15 — Evidence of Bruce Ellison. This 
evidence became available through the Freedom of Information Privacy Acts (FOIPA), U.S.A. after 
Leonard Peltier’s conviction. Exhibits No. 4 and 9 of the Canadian Hearing, October 25, 2000: 
Martin, Brief, supra, note 32. 
46
  Exhibit No. 11 of the Canadian Hearing, October 25, 2000: Martin, Brief, supra, note 32. 
47
  Canadian Hearing, October 25, 2000, at 170, lines 5-8 — Evidence of Bruce Ellison: Mar-
tin, Brief, supra, note 32. 
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The second jailhouse informant, James Adrian Harper, claimed that Darrelle 
Butler48 had provided him with a detailed account of the shootout that had 
occurred on June 26, 1975,49 and allegedly told him that Myrtle Poor Bear was 
in the Jumping Bull compound on Pine Ridge when the two FBI agents were 
shot and killed (the other essential foundation for the extradition affidavits).50 
His testimony was not believed, and, like Bragg, he was never called as a wit-
ness against Peltier.51 
The dangerously unreliable nature of the evidence of jailhouse informants 
such as these, is now notorious.52 They only provide information against other 
inmates when they are promised or hope to receive a reward, which “include[s] 
jailhouse privileges, monetary payments, benefits to third parties, early parole, 
reductions in sentence and the dismissal of pending charges.”53 The desire to 
receive such a reward can strongly motivate a prisoner to lie or provide inaccu-
rate information to the authorities.54 However, the risk that a witness may lie is 
inherent in any justice system. The true danger of this category of witness is the 
risk (well established in the known cases) that, by acquiring information about 
the prosecution’s case, they will purposefully corroborate details of that case. 
They fraudulently incorporate those details into the yarn they spin. Neither 
Bragg nor Harper were credible witnesses. In fact both were proven liars. Sig-
nificantly, both chose to incorporate the “fact” that Myrtle Poor Bear was at the 
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  The original murder indictment named Robert Robideau, Darrelle Butler, Leonard Peltier 
and Jimmy Eagle as co-accused in the murder of Agents Williams and Coler. Leonard Peltier 
sought refuge in Canada while Robideau and Butler’s trial was held in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in 
1976. It was for this trial that the informants were “developed.” The Cedar Rapids jury, who heard 
evidence concerning FBI conduct and the shootout that was excluded from Leonard Peltier’s later 
trial in South Dakota, acquitted Butler and Robideau on the basis of self-defence. Canadian Hear-
ing, October 25, 2000, at 168, line 10 — Evidence of Bruce Ellison: Martin, Brief, supra, note 32. 
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  Exhibit No. 14 of the Canadian Hearing, October 25, 2000: Martin, Brief, supra, note 32. 
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  Exhibit No. 14 of the Canadian Hearing, October 25, 2000: Martin, Brief, supra, note 32. 
51
  Canadian Hearing, October 25, 2000, at 173, line 12: Martin, Brief, supra, note 32. 
52
  Sherrin, “Jailhouse Informants, Part I: Problems with their Use” (1997), 40 Crim. L.Q. 
106, at 108; Zimmerman, supra, note 43, at 57-59. As Cory J. said:  
Jailhouse informants comprise the most deceitful and deceptive group of witnesses 
known to frequent the courts. The more notorious the case, the greater the number of pro-
spective informants. They rush to testify like vultures to rotting flesh or sharks to blood. 
They are smooth and convincing liars. Whether they seek favours from the authorities, at-
tention or notoriety they are in every instance completely unreliable. It will be seen how 
frequently they have been a major factor in the conviction of innocent people and how 
much they tend to corrupt the administration of justice. 
 Jailhouse Informants, Their Unreliability, and the Importance of Complete Crown Disclo-
sure Pertaining to Them, [The Sophonow Inquiry], supra, note 13. 
53
  Sherrin, ibid., at 110. 
54
  Ibid., see Kaufman, Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin, “Executive 
Summary,” supra, note 24.  
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Jumping Bull Ranch — a fact that was patently false. The challenge for the 
Rule of Law is that Myrtle Poor Bear was presented to the extradition hearing 
as an eyewitness to Leonard Peltier’s execution-style murder of two FBI 
agents. She was presented as an intimate, as his girlfriend, a woman to whom 
he confessed his deliberate plan to commit a terrible murder. She was none of 
these. She was only a “vital part” of a concocted extradition case. It may be that 
when the FBI agents were constructing the case for Leonard Peltier’s extradi-
tion, they believed he was responsible for the tragic deaths of Agents Williams 
and Coler, and that “developing” proof when none existed was therefore justi-
fied. It is likely that the prosecutors in the case believed it. It is almost certain 
that the thousands of FBI agents and others who today fight so strenuously to 
keep Leonard Peltier imprisoned believe it. That belief does not make it so. 
The lessons learned from wrongful convictions have prompted new rules to 
resist the dangers posed by witnesses such as these. Justice Cory recommended 
that as a general rule, jailhouse informants should be prohibited from testifying, 
and, even when a special case for their testimony could be made (his example 
was that they could provide the location of a kidnap victim), that exhaustive 
safeguards be followed and that a lengthy mandatory warning be given to the 
jury who heard their evidence. Those safeguards were not in place in 1976 
when Leonard Peltier was extradited from Canada, nor when successive courts 
refused to consider the evidence concerning the Poor Bear affidavits,55 and thus 
his case foreshadows the wrongful conviction scandals of recent years, and the 
brief moment in 2001 when the reliability of result was a factor in consideration 
of due process. 
V.  BURNS AND RAFAY 
Little more than a year ago, the Supreme Court finished hearing the extradi-
tion case of Glen Sebastian Burns and Atif Ahmad Rafay.56 The State of Wash-
ington was seeking the extradition of the two 18-year-old Canadians on first 
degree murder charges and intended to seek the death penalty if convictions 
were secured. The issue before the Court was whether extradition without 
obtaining assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed infringed 
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 In May 1989, Peltier sought leave to appeal the extradition to the Supreme Court of Can-
ada. The leave application was dismissed after an oral hearing. Although no transcript of the 
hearing was available for review, file notes show that during oral argument, La Forest J. observed 
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parties to the extradition arrangement and not for the courts. McKey, File Review, supra, note 42. 
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Burns’ and Rafay’s constitutional rights. The Court had dealt with the same 
issue a decade earlier, and concluded that they would not.57 In 2001 they held 
that section 7 would be violated by an extradition without assurances. What had 
changed? 
The change was that the risk that we would “get it wrong” can no longer be 
ignored. In the first paragraph of the en banc judgment, the Court commenced 
their analysis with that recognition: 
Legal systems have to live with the possibility of error. The unique feature of 
capital punishment is that it puts beyond recall the possibility of correction. In re-
cent years, aided by the advances in the forensic sciences, including DNA testing, 
the courts and governments in this country and elsewhere have come to acknowl-
edge a number of instances of wrongful convictions for murder despite all of the 
careful safeguards put in place for the protection of the innocent. The instances in 
Canada are few, but if capital punishment had been carried out, the result could have 
been the killing by the government of innocent individuals. The names of Marshall, 
Milgaard, Morin, Sophonow and Parsons signal prudence and caution in a murder 
case. Other countries have also experienced revelations of wrongful convictions, 
including states of the United States where the death penalty is still imposed and 
carried into execution.58 
The Court went on to assess the “balancing act” required when the Charter is 
relied on as a means to scrutinize either a decision like that exercised by a judge 
in an extradition,59 or the Minister pursuant to section 25 of the Extradition 
Act.60 For the Court, the risk of wrongful conviction became a central feature of 
a decision to resile from Kindler and Ng. Ten years ago the international appro-
bation of the death penalty was less well developed, and the Court was moved 
then by the in terrorem argument that Canada might become a “haven” for 
desperate murderers fleeing the death penalty if the assurance not to execute a 
fugitive were sought. In Burns that argument was overborne by the concern 
over error: 
The avoidance of conviction and punishment of the innocent has long been in 
the forefront of “the basic tenets of our legal system”. It is reflected in the presump-
tion of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter and in the elaborate rules governing 
the collection and presentation of evidence, fair trial procedures, and the availabil-
ity of appeals. The possibility of miscarriages of justice in murder cases has long 
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  Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779; Reference re Ng Extradition 
(Canada), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858. 
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  Burns, supra, note 15, at para. 1. 
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  R.S.C. 1985, c. E-23 [s. 25 rep. and sub. 1992, c. 13, s. 5]. 
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been recognized as a legitimate objection to the death penalty, but our state of 
knowledge of the scope of this potential problem has grown to unanticipated and 
unprecedented proportions in the years since Kindler and Ng were decided. This 
expanding awareness compels increased recognition of the fact that the extradition 
decision of a Canadian Minister could pave the way, however unintentionally, to 
sending an innocent individual to his or her death in a foreign jurisdiction.61 
The analysis continues with a summation of the most well known of the Ca-
nadian wrongful conviction cases, although with no acknowledgement of the 
frailty of the extradition process itself:  
Our concern begins at home. There have been well-publicized recent instances 
of miscarriages of justice in murder cases in Canada.  
Fortunately, because of the abolition of the death penalty, meaningful remedies for 
wrongful conviction are still possible in this country. 
The first of a disturbing Canadian series of wrongful murder convictions, whose 
ramifications were still being worked out when Kindler and Ng were decided, in-
volved Donald Marshall, Jr. He was convicted in 1971 of murder by a Nova Scotia 
jury. He served 11 years of his sentence. He was eventually acquitted by the courts 
on the basis of new evidence. In 1989 he was exonerated by a Royal Commission 
which stated that: 
 The criminal justice system failed Donald Marshall, Jr. at virtually every 
turn from his arrest and wrongful conviction for murder in 1971 up to, and 
even beyond, his acquittal by the Court of Appeal in 1983. The tragedy of 
the failure is compounded by evidence that this miscarriage of justice could 
— and should — have been prevented, or at least corrected quickly, if those 
involved in the system had carried out their duties in a professional and/or 
competent manner. That they did not is due, in part at least, to the fact that 
Donald Marshall, Jr. is a Native. 
(Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Digest of Findings 
and Recommendations (1989), at p. 1)62 
A closer analysis of the Donald Marshall, Jr., miscarriage of justice would 
have demonstrated that the means utilized to secure his wrongful conviction are 
difficult to uncover at trial — and impossible to reach in a proceeding like an 
extradition. Donald Marshall, Jr., was an aboriginal teenager “known to police” 
when he was wrongly convicted of murdering his friend, an African-Canadian 
youth named Sandy Seale. Police, with little to go on other than bias, jumped to 
the conclusion that Marshall, Jr., was the killer, even though it was Marshall 
who flagged down police to get help for himself (he had been wounded by the 
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62
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real killer) and his friend after they were attacked. Police wanted to believe that 
Marshall was the killer and did not want to believe that a middle-aged white 
man had in fact killed Seale and attacked Marshall. The police did not bother to 
investigate the crime scene or search for independent witnesses. Instead, they 
“developed” informant evidence. They pressured Marshall’s teenaged ac-
quaintances with threats of criminal charges and imprisonment into becoming 
informers against him. In a racially charged community, that was all that was 
needed to secure sufficient (false)  
evidence to obtain a conviction.63 Instead the Court focusses on the finality of 
the death penalty: 
Accordingly, when Canada looks south to the present controversies in the 
United States associated with the investigation, defence, conviction, appeal and 
punishment in murder cases, it is with a sense of appreciation that many of the un-
derlying criminal justice problems are similar. The difference is that imposition of 
the death penalty in the retentionist states inevitably deprives the legal system of 
the possibility of redress to wrongfully convicted individuals.64 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is doubtful that the purely formalistic analysis of due process demonstrated 
in the extradition cases will ever be enough to ensure that no one is wrongly 
extradited or expelled from Canada, just as it will not necessarily lessen the risk 
of more wrongful convictions. Burns illustrates both the strengths and the 
weaknesses of this approach. Its strength is found in its pragmatic but powerful 
simplicity — if a practice is clearly egregious enough, it can and will be 
stopped. However, the path to demonstrating that level of harm is remarkably 
difficult. In the case of Burns, scores of innocents were convicted and even 
executed before the significance of the guarantee of the presumption of inno-
cence rose above the rhetorical. 
There are reasons for adhering to formalistic rather than substantive notions 
of due process. The ideological functions of criminal prosecutions are enhanced 
by preserving the myth that guilt or innocence is always resolved through fair 
and public trials where the facts are contested and the law is challenged. That 
myth in turn generates and sustains other, less benign beliefs, most notably that 
the accused “criminal” has “more rights” than do crime victims; and, that the 
criminal justice system is “soft” on crime. The combination of these latter two 
                                                                                                                                                              
63
  Hickman, Poitras and Evans, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution 
(1989). 
64
  Burns, supra, note 56, at para. 104. 
(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) Extradition, The Charter and Due Process 181 
 
myths in turn fuels government responses to demands for more harsh and de-
terminate sentences, and arguably influences the Courts in their interpretation 
of the meaning and content of the due process guarantees.65 
The reality that lays bare the myth about the protections of due process safe-
guarding convictions is something more dark, more troubling. Most cases in the 
criminal justice system involve targeted, racialized, marginalized people who 
are known to each other and known to the “system,” and most of these cases 
are resolved not in fair and public trials but in secret, through plea negotiations. 
Fewer than 10 or 20 percent of charges actually proceed to a contested trial,66 
and of that percentage, a much smaller number involve cases where factual 
guilt is at issue. Most of the litigated disputes concern matters of justification, 
such as self-defence or consent, or of intention or state of mind, rather than a 
question concerning the identity of the perpetrator, or whether a crime has 
occurred at all. True “who done it” or “what happened” crimes are relatively 
rare. However, they are also the cases that on the one hand command headlines 
and dominate politically motivated “law and order” rhetoric, and that on the 
other hand generate wrongful convictions because of tunnel vision and noble 
cause corruption. We must learn from these errors. Due process must mean 
more than an appearance of fairness. 
But it appears that we have not. Just months after the attacks on the World 
Trade Centre and the Pentagon, due process stopped being identified as providing 
a safeguard against the risk of an irreversible error. Instead the more usual for-
malistic requirement where even the likelihood of the torture of a person expelled 
from Canada is constitutionally acceptable67 if the security claim (secretly crafted 
and impossible to test) is framed in strong enough terms. Untested certificate 
evidence of “danger to the security of Canada” and/or “terrorism,” if formal 
requirements are met by the Minister exercising his or her statutory discretion, 
survive all that is known and objected to in the deportation of persons to face 
torture. No discussion of the risk of error or the evidentiary foundation of the 
terror claim can be found in the judgment. Once more we rely upon the unreli-
able. Nothing much has changed, except that now we know how dangerous that 
can be. 
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